Lessons learned from the Cuban missile crisis

Kennedy was furious—mostly at himself for having been hoodwinked by the old Russian. Upon first seeing the photos through a magnifying glass, his brother Bobby, the attorney general, let loose with a string of expletives, "Oh s—t! s—t! s—t! Those sons of bitches Russians!" according to Max Frankel's excellent "High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." But the U.S. was lucky this time. It had discovered the missiles before they were operational. Kennedy would go on to skillfully negotiate a settlement with Khrushchev through 13 tense days without firing a shot.

But, as Mr. Frankel explains in "High Noon," Kennedy could do this because he had Nikita Khrushchev on the other side of the table. The Soviet leader who instigated this potential disaster had also lived through two world wars, and ultimately did not want to subject his people to another round. "Once you begin shooting, you can't stop," he told his son Sergei, realizing he had overplayed his hand. Kennedy and Khrushchev were adversaries but they were both rational.

Still, if Kennedy had waited a precious few weeks longer, if he had believed the NIE, or if there had been no John McCone to press for the U-2 flight, then the missiles would have been up and ready leaving no alternative to a massive land invasion of Cuba. And the Cuban Missile Crisis may very well have had a decidedly different and much deadlier outcome.

What can we learn from this chapter of history that will help up us deal with future nuclear threats from, say, Iran? Perhaps it's that the most catastrophic consequences come when we talk ourselves into believing what we want to believe.

Today, the client state may be slightly further to the south in Venezuela. The missiles could be deadlier. And the man on the other end of the phone won't be Nikita Khrushchev. Next time a U.S. president could be dealing with the mullahs in Iran.

Mr. Kozak is the author of "LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay"